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SECTION 1
SUMMARY
This document is Task Report 3. TR-3. of the Simulation Verification
Techniques Study, Contract NAS 9-13657. Specifically, th1% report presents
system level self test concepts and requirements for simulator Self Test.
Testing techniques for training simulators are discussed in Section 3.
Three categories of testing are covered: Readiness Tests, Fault Isolation
Tests. and Incipient Fault Detection Testing. Readiness Tests are generally
end to end functional tests. Fault Isolation Tests are performed at a lower
level df hardware detail and therefore point out the faulty LRU when a failure
occurs. Various techniques for Incipient Fault Detection are discussed in
light of their applicability to various simulator subsystems. Incipient Fault
Detection Testing was found to be most useful in decreasing unscheduled maintenance
of the Motion Base System, Visual Simulation, both video and model components.
and servo driven instruments. Readiness Tests are intended to be performed
on a daily basis.
Self'Test software requirements are discussed in Section 4. The proposed
software structure is based on an executive that controls test operations, includ-
ing test software loads for various subsystem tests, checks test results to
s	 determine the next test step, and assembles test results for output to the
r	 operator, to hardcopy devices for permanent records or to mass storage files
for updating of the incipient fault detection data base. The executive is a
s	 batch program that allows the subsystems test software to establish data L rates
T	 and sampling rates. Accurate timing data is obtained by time tagging data
words at the time they are sampled.
The total hardware requirements for implementation of the Self Test System
are listed in Section S. Largest test hardware requirements in terms of cost
r.	 is in the Visual Simulation CCTV subsystem. In terms of numbers, the instru-
mentation for the various controls and displays on-the Crew Station and IOS
are most demanding.
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Section 6 discusses changes and modifications. primarily in the vehicle and
payload complemente and the impact that these changes will have on Simulator
Configuration. Self Test System. and Data Base make up. Changes discussed here
are only those that would take place after installation-and acceptance of the
simulator.
Rel'itive cost data of the Self Test components to the basic simulator
subsystems and to each other are presented in Section 7. Self Test of Visual
Simulation CCTV subsystem and the Crew Station and IOS were found to represent
the most significant portions of the total Self Test System cost. Conclusions
and recommendations, as they pertain to the overall Self Test System Requirements
and implementation are documented in Section S.
1	
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SECTION 2
INTRODUCTION .
This report presents software and hardware requirements for implementing
hardware self test as defined during the Simulation Verification Techniques
Study being conducted for NASA's Johnson Space CeAter under Contract NAS9-13651.
This study is being performed by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company - East
at its Houston Operations facility. Keith L. Jordan. Simulation Development
Branch, FSD. is Technical Monitor of the contract for the NASA.
The Simulation Verification Techniques Study is one of a number of studies
being conducted by NASA-JSC in support of the development of training and pro-
cedures-development simulators for the Space Shuttle Program. The other studies
consist of the following: Shuttle Vehicle Simulation Requirements, NAS9-12836;
Space Shuttle Visual Simulation System Design Study. NAS9-12651, performed by
McDonnell Douglas Electronics Company; Development of Simulation Computer
Complex, NAS9-12882; and Crew Procedures Development Techniques.,NAS9-13660;
both of the latter were performed by McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company -
East at its Houston Operations facility.
The present study is concerned with the development of self test techniques
for simulation hardware and the validation of simulation performance. A pre-
liminary report for the Hardware Verification Task has already been published.
The present report presents the results of an analysis of the requirements of
an integrated simulator self test system. This system consists of the additional
hardware and software required for a training simulator in order to provide
maximum reasonable self test capability. The results in this report will be
Incorporated in the final version of the "Simulation Self Test-Hardware Design
and Techniques Report" to be published shortly.
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SECTION 3
4
INTEGRATED SYSTEM TEST DESCRIPTION
Testing of the simulator as an integrated system involves the sequential,
and sometimes concurrent verification of simulator subsystems and functions.
There are three hierarchical classifications of tests determined by the level
of detail to which the test is performed and the level of confidence obtained
.	 after successful completion of the test. These classifications are Readiness
Tests, Fault Isolation Tests, mil, Incipient Fault Detection Tests.
3.1 READINESS TESTS
Readiness Tests are used to verify the readiness of simulator subsystems
to perform according to design and operational requirements. Generally these
tests check each of the simulator subsystems and, whenever possible, use
already verified subsystems to check other subsystems , of the simulator. Ideally
readiness tests are and to end tests. They are primarily concerned with test-
ing a complete string of hardware.
The sequence of subsystem testing developed in the course of this study
r	 is based on the "building block" approach of establishing the operational
readiness of a system element before that element can be used to test other
portions of the system under test, in this case the simulator: Figure 3.1-1
shows the sequential and parallel arrangement for test execution during the
Readiness Test. Individual tests shown at the same horizontal level can be
executed simultaneously by the various relatively independent processors in
the simulator. Checkout of the HOST computer is required prior to commencing
with simulator checkout.
Each of the vertical strings indicate dependence of tests, lower on the
chart, on successful completion of previous tests. For example, the simulator
interface minicomputer must pass successfully its readiness self test prior to
z executing the routines for . DCE self test. Failure of the minicomputer to pass
this test would return information to the HOST regarding the point or function
at which the test failed. On the other hand, a failure in the DCE would prevent
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Crew Station or visual Simulation system checkout; and it would be up to HOST
computer software to determine what automatic fault isolation tests should
be run on the OCE.
The self test software is, initially in mass • storage elements of the HOST
computer complex, and is laded into the system under control of and
through the interface facilities of the HMP` computer. At the conclusion of
the load, each processor returns to the HOST a message indicating that the
lad has been completed, and some other information such as a checksum which the
HOST can then use to verify that a successful, accurate load has been accomplished.
After the loading process is completed, and the HOST has verified that all
went well, each processor is commanded by the HOST to execute the subsystem
Self Test programs.
The simulator processing elements that receive this self test software
lad are the Flight Equipment Interface Device processors; the simulator inter-
face for the OCE, crew station, visuals, and motion base; and the IOS Graphics
minicomputer. Testing of the Flight Computers is not performed until after
the FEID is thoroughly checked out; therefore, loading of the Flight Computer
self test software does not take place until after completion of FEID Sell Test.
This particular sequence is necessary because FC Self Test requires correct
performance of FEID hardware not only during the load, but also in checking
FC capability to communicate with avionic components external to the FC and
-simulated by the FEID.
Completion of each level of Readiness Tests results in control being returned
to the HOST, which then logs any subsystem operational data gathered during the
test, issues appropriate messages to the Test Operator, and determines the next
logical step in the test sequence.
The following sections discuss briefly the nature and extent of the
Readiness test for each of the major simulator subsystems.
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3.1.1 FEID Readiness Tests
The major elements of the FEID tested during the Readiness Test are the
processors • or*the vario>n interfaces. The types of tests perforwed on these
elementse as well as the Central Buffer Storage, are swch that thorough and
progressive checks are made on each portion of the FEID. Failure to pass one
of.those tests Immediately points to a fault In the LRU being tested, and
therefore these tests, by their thoroughness and level of detail, obviate the
need for fault isolation tests.
At the completion of FEID Readiness Test, the HOST is inforwed of which
LRU's, if any, have failed and require repair or replacement action. The HOST
can then report this information to the test operator, together with possible
diagnostic information that would aid the maintenance personnel in repatring
faults detected.
3.1.2 FC Readiness Tests
	 '
The Flight Computer elements, as Is the case with the FEID, will be
thoroughly checked during the Readiness Tests. The subsystem level self test
analysis indicated that. automatic testing of the FC's should rely on using
vendor supplied diagnostic software. This software will be available, and
will yield a higher level of confidence on readiness of'the flight hardware
than would be likely to be achieved by software developed especially for
simulator application.
Use of test software supplied by the FC manufacturer will provide an adequate
level of fault isolation. For the FC's, therefore, no additional fault isola-
tion tests are recommended.
3.1.3 Simulator Interface Computer and IOS Graphics Minicomputer Readiness Tests
The simulator interface computer and the graphics computar are commercially
available computer systems. These computers will be * dly procured for the
specific simulator applications. As part of that procurement, it will be necessary
to assure that these computers have available adequate software for accomplishing
functional checks of the basic computer elements. In implementing these functional
tests, the faults which may be detected are immediately related to the LRU level.
3-4
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Consequently no special fault isolation tests are required for these computers.
The test capabilities required for the functional test software are discussed
.as part of the analyses of the ancillary computer y for the simulator configurations
considered for this study.
3.1.4 DCE Readiness Test
The OCE Readiness Test, as developed during the subsystem analysis portion
of the study, consists primarily of switching output bllevel and analog channels
on to input channels. Generation of predetermined outputs is followed by
measuring corresponding inputs and then determining that input patterns, for
bilevel DCE, or valuess for analog DCE, agree with the outputs. This type of
test adequately verifies the health status of each individual channel, and if
a failure occurst can point to or isolate the pair of channels, input and outputs
where a fault might exist.
3.1.5 Crew Station/IOSReadi_
The crew station contains a variety of display, control, and instrumentation
components. These are both digital and analog devices, and within these cate-
gories there are significant differences in the physical, electrical and
performance characteristics of the many components used. This variety prevents
the use of functional performance testing of groups of components and requires
that each individual meter or switch be tested individually to ascertain
Readiness. This component by component test approach during the Readiness
Test leads directly to fault isolation and identification of the faulty components
without any additional Crew Station Fault Isolation Test.
3.1.6 Motion Bast Readiness Tests
The motion base readiness testing consists of two basic elements. The first
of these is the monitoring of sensor levels during power on and power off static
checks. The second element is the analysis of dynamic test data to assess motion
base dynamic performance adequacy. The dynamic test data may be obtained either
from specially executed motions as part of the readiness test or it may be
data accomulated on-line during the previous operational period.
The sensor data directly identifies faults in the systems since it monitors
specific parameters such as hydraulic fluid level or pressure drop across a filter.
There 1s no additional . requlrement for fault isolation with respect to these parameters.
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However, the dynamic data obtained for a synergistic motion base can be
chocked for proper performance without any insight being obtained into the likely
sources of out of specification performance for the actuator servo systems. Fault
isolation analyses may be applied to obtain the desired insight.
I	 . 3.1.7 Visual Simulation Readiness
End to and testing can be used successfully in establishing operational
readiness of the Visual Simulation System. Enough information can be gathered
by inserting a test signal at the CCTV camera and taking measurements at CRT grids
to determine whether performance of the video equipment is acceptable to
proceed with normal simulator operations. The servo systems that control probe*
cameraq and model motion can also be checked using functional end to and
testing. As in the other subsystems, fault isolation testing is only initiated
when a fault is detected during the-Readiness Test. Failure data is furnished
to the fault isolation software to determine which tests to run, and which strings
of hardware to test during the ' fault isolation process.
3-6
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3.2 FAULT ISOLATION TESTS
	 •
Fault isolation tests are performed following a failure during normal
operation or after detecting a fault during the Readiness Tests, in order to
localise the fault or source of failure to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
This localization is requi red to permit prompt repair by replacing the failed
LRU. Whereas Readiness Tests can be performed at the functional level (the
ability to generate ai audio tone with the Aural Cues System), the Fault
Isolation Tests are performed at the hardware LRU level (verifying that the
analog signal output from a DAC corresponds to the digital pattern input to
it). Fault Isolation Tests, because they go to a lower level of hardware
detail, are more exhaustive, take more time to run on any particular subsystem,
and achieve a higher level of confidence on the health of the hardware than
achieved by Readiness Tests.
There are subsystems that because of their characteristics, must be tested
in detail in order to ascertain an acceptable level of readiness. These subsystems
are not addressable by higher level, functional testing as part of the daily
Readiness Test. 'these subsystems inusude tho Flight Equipment Interface Device,
FEID, the Flight Uimputers, the computers for the Simulator and graphics inter-
faces, and the Crew Station and IDS instrumentation, displays and controls.
The readiness tests for these subsystems, as discussed in the previous section,
effectively isolate faults to the LRU level required.
There are, hoMever, several subsystems that are suitable for extended
testing for fault isolation or in fact, require quite extensive additional
tasting in order to achieve identification of defective LRU's. These consist
of the Data Conversion Equipment, the Motion Base, the Visual Simulation
Subsystems, and the Aural Simulation subsystem. The Fault Isolation Test
requirements for these subsystems are discussed fi the following paragraphs.
3.2.1 DCE Fault Isolation Tests
At the end of the Readiness Test, the HOST is informed of the pairs of
&-h•,nnels, if any, where faults were detected. The Test Operator is given this
`ormation and the o ption to terminate DCE testing or to command the HOST
initiate the DCE Fault Isolation Test. It is possible that the channels
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that failed readiness testing are spare channels, not in use, and therefore
no further fault isolation is required. On the other hand, if the channel is
in use, the operator may patch around the faulty channel by making the necessary
hardware and software data base changes to permit the use of alternate channels.
This course of action may expedite activation of the simulator and obviate the
need ftr fault isolation and maintenance operations, which would then be deferred
to a more convenient, lower interference time.
If the Test Operator chooses to perform automatic fault isolation, he
notifies the HOST and initiates loadinq and execution of the DCE Fault Isolation
Tests. The objective of these tests is to determine which LRU in the DCE is
faulty and therefore s l-ould be replaced or repaired.
'nw first step in the DCE fault isolation process is to determine whether
the faulty channel in the suspected pair is the output or the input. This
can be accomplished, as discussed in previously documented DCE Self Test
analysis. If the fault is determined to be in an output bilevel channel, the
fault isolation process continues to determine whether the faulty LRU is the
digital output routing and address decoding logic, or the memory and drive
circuitry. If the fault is in the bilevel input channel, then the isolation
process will localize the fault in the input multiplexer and address decoder
logic, or the bilevel signal receiver circuit. Problems in a pair•of analog
channels will cause the fault isolation testing procedure to determine whether
the faulty LRU is the DAC or analog driver in the output, or the Buffer Amplifier
or ADC in the input. The 'fault isolation process for both bilevel and analog,.
channel LRU ' s has already been documented in the Self Test Design and Techniques
analysis portion of the study.
3.2.2 Motion Base Fault Isolation
Although many of the components that may require periodic servicing can
be measured by direct sensing, the isolation of faults based on dejradation of
hydraulic actuator system performance is a factor that may be amenable to
--^lysis. Fault Isolation Tests for the motion base require consideration
the frequeoicy response of the servo systems or servo loops of which the
•	 3-8
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hydraulic actuators are the major components. Definition of the frequency
response enables comparison of breakpoint data with fault dictionary information
which is established by simulation of the motion base actuator servo systems.
Analysis of this data then permits identification of the particular components
or likely components which are causing the degraded performance.
3.2.3 Visual Simulation Fault Isolation
In the Visual Simulation System there are two major types of hardware:
one is the primarily electronic elements which make up the Closed Circuit
Television system and include camera, camera control, video processing, display
switching and the displays themselves. The other type is the electromechanical,
servo controlled elements used to move and position the various components of
the camera/model based simulation. This type includes the spherical earth
models, the camera gantry and its driving system, and the probe pointing
attitude control servo systems. The fault isolation approach for the CCTV
components is based on a progressive test of succeeding LRU's in the video
string until the failed LRU is switched in and unusual performance degradation
is detected. On the other hand, fault isolation for the model drive components
concentrates on analyzing that control string which exhibited unacceptable
performance during the Readiness Test. Characteristic parameters of each
LRU in that string are measured in order to ascertain operational status of
each LRU and determine which is the one that has failed. The actual sequence
of fault isolation tests for each string-of hardware has alrr;dy been documented
r:	 in the Visual Simulation System Self Test Analysis part of the study.
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3.3 INCIPIENT FAULT DETECTION
This section covers incipient fault detection testing techniques and their
applicability to simulator hardware. First of all, a set of criteria to determine
which components can profit from this third class of testing is discussed.
Then various methods to perform incipient fault detection are presented with
emphasis on the one selected, that of gathering historical operational data
and looking for trends that point to eventual failure of a component. The
applicability criteria were applied to all the simulator subsystems, and a
set of relevant parameters, along with processing techniques were defined for
each of the subsystems that could benefit from incipient fault detection.
These parameters and techniques are documented for each subsystem at the end
of this section.
3.3.1 Incipient Fault Detection Criterii
The primary objective of incipient fault detection testing is to identify
potential failures before they occur. This objective becomes quite important
in components that require extensive simulator downtime to repair or replace.
For example, an electronic module can be replaced in seconds, and if it fails
during simulator operation, only a few minutes would be lost from the training
schedule. On the other hand, if a hydraulic fluid accumulator ruptures, it
would take hours to replace, if a spare were available, and even longer to
repair, reassemble the plumbing, and recharge the hydraulic system to replace
the lost fluid. In the first case, the payoff from incipient fault detection
implementation is measured in minutes saved when the weakening module is
replaced during non operational time. In the latter case, incipient fault
detection analysis can point to the sticky.valve, the surging pump, or the
clogged filter that could eventually result in rupture of the accumulator.
This information could be used to replace or repair the faulty component during
a more convenient maintenance shift, instead of having to face the situation
described above that would cause the loss of one or several training shifts,
following rupture of the accumulator.
0
This example illustrates the primary criterion used in determining which
subsystems should be analyzed for possible application of incipient fault
detection techniques: if an LRU in a system requires more than one hour for
i
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The second criterion in determining applicability of incipient fault
detectiorr is the physical and functional nature of the LRU involved. Some
components, notably solid state electronic circuit elements, do not exhibit
degradation characteristics that can point to eventual failure. These devices
usually fail as a result of a single overstress condition that causes fusion
or breakage of the delicate semiconductor material, thereby changing•the
electronic characteristics of the unit. It is not possible to predict a
failure in this type of circuitry, and even though it may be desirable to do
so because of maintainability considerations, no known incipient fault detection
technique can be effectively applied here.
On the other hand, there are LRU's, notably electromechanical devices,
that do age and wear out either because of mechanical function or by chemical
changes within the device. For example, an electrical motor may exhibit
erratic starting characteristics. This condition may be an indication that
the bearings or seals have worn down, or that capacitors in the starting
circuitry have aged to the point that eventually a failure might occur that
could require extensive overhaul of the motor. Early detection of the•incipient
fault permits scheduling of overhaul as part of normal maintenance operations.
However, this early detection can only be effected on components that degrade
or age to the point that may eventually result in a failure. '
To summarize then, the two basic criteria for determining applicability
of incipient fault detection techniques to a particular subsystem are:
•	 1. Maintainability characteristics of the LRU must be such that repair
or replacement time would exceed one hour.
3.11
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2. Physical, functional and aging characteristics of the LRU are such
that unit integrity degrades with time to an unacceptable or failure
level, rather than failing a tastrophictlly and unpredictably.
F	 3.3.2 Incipient Fault Detection Technidue	 .
Various techniques for performing incipient fault detection were analyzed
during Subtask 1.2 of the study, and are documented in more detail in the
c	 previously published Self Test Techniques Report. They are reviewed here for
reference. The four techniques analyzed were:
1. Overstt•-,s Testing. The LRU is operated at the high end or beyond
the high ;stress limit of the operational band. This overstress
operation should be within the safety margin normally encountered
in hardware design. If operation is faulty, it may be a symptom of
possible future failure. Examples of this type of testing are fre-
quency response tests it higher frequencies than required
	
in normal
operation, or testing of electrical components at higher voltage than
the maximum specified for normal performance. The greatest disadvantage
to this technique is that it may force a failure at a time when main-
tenance would impact simulator operational schedule. If properly
'	 scheduled, however, this technique could be a useful tool to detect
e	 weaknesses in some simulator components.
2. Marginal Testing. The LRU is operated at the low end or beyond the
f-	 low stress limit of the operational band. This technique, like
overstress testing can be used to detect degradations in components
that may lead to a failure. Examples of marginal testing would be
running the motion base with lower than normal hydraulic fluid system
pressure, or slewing a camera gantry slowly enough to find sticky
points along the range of travel that indicate a possible accumulation
of dirt on the track, or flaws in the driving mechanism that can
lead to a future failure.
3-12
wAcooNDWELL ooua"O AAMMN~"Cs ao"tawrr. Nwst
MCC El 149
20 September 1974
3. Grey Area Performance Dbtection. The LRU is tested within its normal
band of operation. but a warning is issued when performance drops
below a predefined level. This technique assumes progressive per-
formance degradation which becomes a failure below a predefined level.
If a higher level is defined to create a warning or "grey" area, then
performance within this area, although acceptable, is an indication
that the unit has degraded to such a point that a failure will soon
occur. Simulator operations personnel should then schedule maintenance
of the LRU in order to preempt thi actual occurance of the failure.
4. Rate of Degradation. Measure and record historical data on a parameter
that indicates degradation of performance in a particular LRU, and
use this data to compute rate of degradation. If this rate increases
or changes markedly, it may,point to an imminent failure of the unit.
The amount of time during which historical data is recorded depends
on the nature of the component and the slope of tho normal or average
degradation function for that type of component.
If degradation.takes place very fast, as in the case of a slightly
ruptured hydraulic filter that through usage might enlarge the rupture
and eventually break down, then there is no need to store data for
months. Information gathered for the last five days may be enough to
indicate that something has happened to the device, and that its
performance is fast degrading and that soon a failure will occur. On
the other hand, a slowly degrading component such as an electrolytic
capacitor may require processing of data acquired for a period of
weeks to indicate that the component has reached its "last leg" in
the degradation function, and that soon it will fail totally.
Techniques number 3 and number 4 are the ones that offer the greatest value
for simulator incipient fault detection testing. Their advantages lie in that
no unusual operational conditions have to be created, and therefore, normal
•	 operation or readiness testing exercises can be used to gather the necessary
data to detect incipient faults. Therefore, these techniques do not need
additional test hardware or control software beyond that which is required to
perform the Readiness Tests or Fault Isolation Tests.
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3.3.3 Incipient .Fault Detection Implementation
Using the Incipient Fault Detection Applicability Criteria in analyzing
simulator subsystems. it was determined that incipient fault detection tech-
niques would benefit the operational utility of the following subsystems:
- Hydraulic Motion Base System
- Visual Simulation Video Components
- Visual Simulation Model Drives and Controls.
- Servo Driven Instrumentation
These are the system elements that exhibit progressive degradation character-
istics and would require the simulator to be out of service a substantial period
while maintenance takes place. Table 3.3-1 summarizes the use of incipient
fault detection techniques on each subsystem. Integration of these techniques
is a part of recommended self test procedures.
TABLE 3.3-1 INCIPIENT FAULT DETECTION TECHNIQUES APPLICABILITY
SYSTEM ELEMENT
INCIPIENT'FAUI.T DETECTION TECHNIQUES
Overstress	 Marginal	 Gray Area	 Rate of
Testing Performance Degradation
Hydraulic Motion Base System X X X X
Visual Simulation Video X X X
Components
Visual Simulation Model X X X
Drives And Controls
Servo Driven Instrumentation X X X
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3.4 TEST SEQUENCING
The three types of testing discussed above have been integrated into a
recommended simulator self test concept. This self test approach is based
on several assumptions and on the above description of-the basic nature of
these tests when applied to specific simulator subsystems. The general test
approach and test sequencing are most evident in the discussion of the Simulator 	 s
Self Test Software Description presented in Section 4. 'In this section, we will
review the rationale for test sequencing and distribution of test operations as
it relates to the three types of testing involved.
The readiness tests are intended to be overall functional tests for the
various simulator subsystems and as such should require only a limited amount 	
t
of time to execute. It is assumed that the readiness tests would nominally be
executed every day or at the beginning of each training shift. In the event
that a failure or fault is detected by the Readiness Test, it may be necessary
to execute a Fault Isolation Test in order to identify more precisely the LRU
which is the source of the problem. As previously discussed, this is only
necessary in the case of the DCE, the motion base, the visual system and the
W I.	 aural simulations.
If the fault isolation test is required, then a question arises as to
whether it should be executed automatically or whether the operator should
be required to initiate the additional test by further positive action. In
design of the test software, Section 4, automatic execution is assumed since
this establishes the necessary basic sequence elements. The introduction of
pauses or overriding interrupt logic is a relatively minor and optional problem
when the software is implemented.	 i
Figure 3.4-1 illustrates the operational sequencing of Readiness, Fault
Isolation, and Incipient Fault Detection Testing. The basic data for the
Incipient Fault Detection Test can be obtained in most cases during the
readiness test execution- as shown in this Figure. However, if a fault is
detected during the readiness test, then the data obtained should not be
entered into the Incipient Fault Detection data base. Tests for this contingency
are shown in the software flows.
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FIGURE 3.3-1 DAILY SELF TEST SEQUENCE
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In summary, then, if the Fault Isolation Tests are initiated automatically. 	 a
the operator will be provided with an output which identifies the following:
0 Subsystems tested that have successfully completed the readiness check
o Sybsystems tested that have failed the readiness.check
o Results of Fault Isolations Tests for faulty subsystems
o Results of analyses of'Incipient Fault Detection Test data, including
the following:
o LRU's that have moved into a gray area and are approaching
an unsatisfactory level of performance
	 ••
o Projected failure dates/times for near term critical LRU's
The operator must then decide whether to constrain the type of activities
allowed in simulator usage, or to initiate maintenance or replacement of,the
components identified as failed. The output from self tests then is an indi-
cation • of the readiness status of the system, including information helpful
in trouble shooting or restoring any faulty functions or components of the
Simulator.
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SECTION 4	 .
SIMULATOR SELF TEST SOFTWARE DESCRIPTION
The simulator self test software has been designed and structured so as
to implement the test sequences discussed in Section 3 with respect to both
the order of subsystem testing and the order in which the various types of
tests are executed. Since the simulators of interest don't exist currently
but are expected to be multi-computer systems with satellite processors available
to handle input/output processing, data reformatting, and other miscellaneous
operations, it is impossible to predict with much certainty the amount of
computing power available in these peripheral processors. Therefore, it is
also impossible to rationalize, at this point, the distribution of self test
functions between the host computer and the interface computers. , As a result,
the approach taken in designing the software defers that problem to a later
time and presents the software structure so as to define hierarchies of
software modules, and the necessary sequencing of operations and channels of
data communication.
A simulator self test software tree is shown in Figure 4-1. The software
modules are identified by both an acronym, suitable for programming use, and
a descriptive title. The modules shown in this tree do not have the relationship
usually implied by a software tree in the sense that the modules at the two
lower levels are not subprograms to the modules above them. Instead the impli-
cation of the structure of the tree is that modules at the same level may be
exercised concurrently and independently, resources permitting; all modules in
the same string but at a higher level must be exercised successfully before
that module may be exercised; or, in other words, the modules in a string must
be exercised in a top down sequence. All of these modules and programs will
be controlled in their execution by the test executive and consequently in
an ordinary tree would all be shown directly connected to the executive. Each
of these modules is further described in detail in the final report for the
hardware techniques task. In this report, we will limit ourselves to describing
the test executive software.
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4.1 SELF TEST EXECUTIVE SOFTWARE
A software flow for the test executive is shown in Figure 4-2. The test
executive is primarily concerned with controlling the order and extent of the
testing executed and comtmunicating the proper output messages and data for
operator use as well as for storage in the data base for incipient fault
detection. The test executive accomplishes its function by initiating and
controlling the loading of all test software from mass storage facilities,
commanding execution of the tests, reviewing the processed results from the
tests and then selecting the proper course of action which will include in
most casiss the presentation of data to the operator, the selection of
^-	 addltipnal.tests, the storage of historical data in data base files, and ther•
!.	 printing of test data reports.
It should be noted that the test executive does not become involved in
the dynamic test timing function. The test data sampling rates are established
by the test software for each subsystem being tested. Time tags for the data
points are obtained from an external clock and are loaded into the controlling
computer at the same time the data words are loaded. This minimizes the depen-
dence of the subsystem tests on proper operation of all computer and interface
timing functions and eliminates unpredictable interrupts and interrupt processing
as an error source in test da ta timing.
The executive does contain the logic to decide on the course of action
after each level of testing is completed. This logic requires access to the
test results temporarily stored in a memory buffer.
When testing is completed or has proceeded to a standstill, the executive
formats the data, if necessary, and communicates the appropriate information
as follows:
o Operator display - Operator action requirements, including "system ready"
o Hardcopy printer - Daily test results summary and reference data
o	 Data base file - Incipient fault data base update
4-3
mcO svowaLL aovoLAi ^swaroNAcmes cow j%4mv- fAer
W.
^ 1
IOC 91149
20 Sptsmmr 1974
• ASI s
_^	 t ..
"^	 w • R
1	 ^	 1
i
1 lip Wtl
^'^	 Er_
el
N
N
1
a
If
4-4
MCOOOVOWN" 00e/OL^o Al77fONAfJT/Cf
OF PZNAL PAGE L;
OOR QUALITY
sL--•
8
aJ
W
ON
ar
s
W
HNWF-
WJWN
N1
rLi
MOC 11149
xG Saptambar 1974
Hil
I	 II	 iI	 .
I	 I
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALM.
4.5
MC=hCM+vsLt oovoLAw As*wopvALJT/cs QorNpwmv • fAwr
4-6
MCOOMNtLL OONOLA• AlVWaNA&MCS COMI44NV = NAer
MDC El 149
•	 20 Septefter 1974
4.2 SUBSYSTEM TEST SOFTWARE
The subsystem test software, such as FITST or MBTST, is loaded by the
executive, TESTER, and includes the programming which implements the tests, the
characteristic parameter data associated with the hardware being tested, and
the date processing software required for reducing the test data. The output
of the subsystem test software is stored in a memory buffer for final disposition
by the executive, TESTER.
There are three different types of testing/processing at the subsystem
level. These consist of readiness testing, fault isolation testing, and inci-
pient fault detection processing, and are usually executed in that order.
The readiness tests are ideally end-to-end tests or total performance
tests for a subsystem. If a readiness test indicates a fault and fault
isolation tests are applicable, the decision to proceed with fault isolation
can be taken automatically at the subsystem test software level, and the logic
is shown accordingly as part of the subsystem tests. It is recognized that
this decision could be exercised at the executive level where the-results of
other concurrent subsystem tests could also be considered. The decision can
also be reserved for manual selection by the operator. Final choices can be
•'made during software implementation without any significant impact on the
software development.
Incipient fault detection data should nominally be gathered during the
readiness tests. If a fault is detected at that time, the incipient fault
detection data may be adversely affected. Consequently, the decision should
be made at the subsystem level to delete this data and not add it to the data
base. Otherwise, the incipient fault detection data is communicated to the
executive through the memory buffer.
MDC El 149
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SECTION 5
SELF TEST SYSTEM HARDWARE
This section summarizes the total hardware requirements to implement the
simulator Self Test System developed in the course of the study. The hardware
listed includes only those components added for test purposes. A primary ground-
rule of the study was to maximize use of operational hardware in carrying out
the Self Test job. This groundrule has been adhered to throughout the study,
and hardware used in this manner is not specifically identified in this section.
Cost data on Self Test System hardware 1s presented and discussed in Section 7.
Table 5.0-1 is a list of the various components added to each of the sub-
systems for Self Test purposes. Each'photosensor used for galvanometer testing
include a photodiode as a built-in light source. These devices are compatible
with signal levels of logic circuitry used in the Data Conversion Equipment and
therefore, no additional signal conditioning components are needed.
The current sensor circuits used to verify operation of lighted.indicators
are. counted as a single component per indicator. These sensor circuits contain
resistors, diodes, and transistors. However, each sensor circuit can be packaged
as an individual module and using state of the art circuit integration techno-
logy, the circuits could be packaged right in the indicator assembly.
The loop closure switches listed for the Analog DCE are those solid state
switches used to connect output channels to input channels in order to verify
DCE operational status. Also under DCE is included the necessary components,
ADC, switches, and buffer amplifiers needed to provide input channels for
measurements taken during the Self Test process, measurements using instru-
mentation specifically added as part of the Self Test System.
Table 5.0-2 shows the breakdown of additional DCE channel requirements for
Self Test. These requirements cover the data acquisition channels used speci-
fically to measure characteristic parameters of simulator hardware during
Readiness, Fault Isolation, or Incipient Fault Detection testing. No additional
command channels were identified for applying test stimuli to operational hardware.
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TABLE 5.0-1 HARDWARE ADDED FOR SELF TEST
COMPONENT	 QUANTITY
Galvanometers (70)
3 photosensors in each 	 210
Lighted Indicator Current Sensor Circuits	 700
Analog DCE - Loop Closure Switches
•	 Closure to test input channels	 200
Crew station isolation and connection of output
channels to the 200 operational input channels 	 200
Analog DCE Test Channel Components
ADC	 1
Buffer amplifiers 120
Solid state analog switches 120
Bilevel DCE - Loop Closure Gating and
Digital	 Input Multiplex Selection Gates 2500
Visual Simulation System Self Test Hardware.
Digital processing oscilloscope 1
Signal generator 1
Signal to noise meter 1
Video switches 16
Video buffer amplifiers 36
Motion Base
Pressure sensors 5
Level sensor 4
Temp sensor 2
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TABLE 5.0-2 ADDITIONAL DCE CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR SELF TEST
COMPONENT TESTED CHANNEL REQUIREMENTS
Bilevel. Analog
Galvanometers 210
Servometers 16
Tapemeters . 20
ADI (4 units)
4 wire sin/cos, 3 channels each 48
6 pointer position feedback' 24
signals from each ADI
Lighted Indicator 700
Electromechanical Flags 400
-Switches - No extra lines for testing
Visual Model	 Servos
3	 cameras x 6 servos 18
Terminal area transport servos 4
Orbital earth position resolver 30
Cloud/sky/terminator altitude servos 3•
Motion Base
Sensors	 11
Position, actuators 6 17
1388 102
Wi th Sp- .res 1500 125
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However, in the case of the video components of the Visual Simulation System, the
test controlling computer, with DCE, must issue the necessary commands to re-
configure the test hardware and-control the test execution. These commends acti-
vate the DPO, signal generators, and measuring equipment used to test video
elements. The number of these commands is relatively small (less than 20) and
represent negligible impact on the total DCE.
On the other hand, the additional input channel requirements of 1500 bi-
level and 125 analog channels for Self Test purposes represent an effective
doubling of DCE capability when compared with the'Reference Configuration
magnitudes-of 2000 bilevel and 100 analog channels. Considerable increase
in parts and manufacturing cost should be expected from the fact that the in-
crease in DCE capability is more accentuated on the analog instead of the bilevel
side of the DCE. Analog channel components are larger, more complex, and more
costly than the gating required to add bilevel channels.
Additional t"t hardware for the Visual Simulation System consists
of the Digital Processing Oscilloscope, a video test waveform generator, a
signal to noise meter, and the necessary switching to isolate each LRU
during the testing sequence. No additional hardware is expected for testing
model scene generation equipment other, than that listed under DCE.
The Motion Base test hardware consists of the sensors and signal conditioning
circuits required to route characteristic parameter data to the computer. Normally
these parameters are only routed to the maintenance panel either electrically,
mechanically, or hydraulically. In order to implement the automatic Self Test
capability developed in this study, it is also necessary to digitize charac-
teristic parameter data and supply them to the computer conducting the test.
The amount of hardware discussed above is a significant measure of the
impact on simulator design and maintenance by the addition of automatic Self
Test. Cost data related to this impact is discussed in Section 7. However,
at this point it is important to point out that parts cost is a small part of
total impact when compared with the total cost that includes generation of
5-4
MCOOMMlLL EP000LAe AlrIPOMA&r"Ce COMO RAMY- tier
5-5
MCDONNffLo. 00
•	 MOC [1149
20 September 1974
additional wiring instructions. manufacturing additional housing space for these
components, actual wiring cost, and increase in acceptance and integrated test-
ing of the resulting system. All of these costs, however, may be offset by the
increase achieved in simulator availability and utility during the operational
life of the system. They also represent a very smell percent increase to
simulator total procurement cost.
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SECTION 6
SYSTEM IMPACT BY REQUIREMENTS OR DESIGN CHANGES
This section discusses various types of changes that can occur after the
simulator has become operational and the sources of changes. Particular
attention is given to the impact of these chan94s both on the Simulator
System as well as in the Self Test System. This discussion is the basis for
assessing the effect of changes on the operational simulator and Simulator
Self Test systems, and for formulating some recommendations that could
minimize impact.
6.1 SOURCES OF CHANGE
As indicated above, this section only deals with changes initiated after
the simulator has been installed, accepted, and is in its operational phase.
Changes during design or development of the simulator per se are not considered
here, because these changes are allowed a greater impact than those during
the operational phase, and also because when considering the implementation
of development changes, the impact of these changes on other parts of the
system is evaluated before permitting implementation.
The major sources of changes during the operational life of the Simulator are:
1. Mission peculiar requirements variation from flight to flight.
2. Vehicle design changes.
3. Advancements in state of the art and
4. Performance enhancements.
These sources of change are discussed below.
6.1.1 Mission Peculiar Requirements Variations
The primary mission of Shuttle simulators is to provide a training facility
for the various piloting and mission oriented crews that will man Shuttle
controls during the life of the program. Although the aerodynamic and vehicle
performance characteristics will not vary considerably from flight to flight,
It is reasonable to expect significent changes in mission objectives, payload
management requirements, and general procedures as dictated by the type of
trajectory, orbital characteristics, and manuevering requirements needed to
accomplish these mission objectives.
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Mission related changes manifest themselves-in the Simulator in the need
4	 for special payload management controls, payload related math models,, and
development of procedures that permit efficient utilization of vehicle and
{ payload systems in accomplishing mission objectives. A dramatic example of
mission related Simulator changes is the addition of payload environmental
control and life support management facilities in the crew station, as well
as the addition of math model restrictions in payload manipulation when
changing Simulator configuration from a Shuttle carrying only unmanned pay-
i lads, to one carrying a mix of manned and'unmanned payloads.
6.1.2 Vehicle Design Changes
This source of Simulator changes is more difficult to visualize at this
point in the Shuttle program. The design of the vehicle is an ongoing effort,
and additions and changes are taking place on a daily basis. It would be
Ideal A f this process could achieve an optimal configuration prior to the
first space flight; however, experience in previous programs has shown
otherwise, and therefore, it is reasonable to expect design changes to take
place as problems become more apparent during early flights of the Shuttle.
Design changes may affect vehicle performanvi or payload accomodation
facilities and consequently alter the control and displays layout in the
crew station, as well as the looks, feel or sound of related cues.
6.1.3 State of the Art Advancements
Even more difficult to visualize than vehicle design changes are those
modifications that result from advances in the state of the art of simulator
hardware. Generally, these modifications result in the replacement of multiple
components for an integrated system that performs the same job more effectively.
Effectiveness in this case refers to fidelity of simulation as a primary
intention, and cost of ope-,:tion when compared with the price of implementing
the change.
6.1.4 Performance Enhancement
The fourth source of simulator modifications is the need to improve perfor-
mance of the simulator beyond that which was specified, and supposedly met as
shown by acceptance test results. Again, the'primary consideration in this
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case is fidelity of simulation. The situation may develop such that although
the simulator. performs as specified, it does not present realistic cues to the
crew so that positive training can take place in an environment that truly
represents the vehicle in looks, feels, sound, and performance; co,sequently,
modifications are needed to enhance the simulation capability of the system.
Performance enhancement changes would generally manifest themselves in
the installation of new equipment, or replacement of existing components with
units that have more capability. These changes would usually result in an
increase of complexity in the simulator system,'and therefore increase the
need for control as well as data acquisition channels in quantity and sometimes
in capability.
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6.2 IMPACT OF SIMULATOR CHANGES
Implementation of changes on the simulator system requires additions$
deletions. and reconfigurations of hardware and software. This impact will affect
simulation as well as self test elements. In many cases t also l the character-
istic parameter data base will be impacted. Table 6.2-1 itemises the impact
of various changes on the affected elements of the system.
The impact analysis for changes in interface minicomputers, visual simu-
lation, and motion base is unnecessary since changes in these subsystems are
unlikely after simulator acceptance. These subsystems are large, complex,
and generally the subject of individually managed procurement efforts. This
special attention in procurement yields comprehensive requirement specifications
for components that are reliable. maintainable. and capable of meeting future
needs of the simulator
The Crew Station and IOS control and display elements may be changed
either by vehicle changes * mission requirement changes. or the need to improve
fidelity of simulation. Flight hardware used as part of the simulator system
may al ... ^,% the subject of change by either of the reasons mentioned above.
The chaiiyei shown on Table 6.2-1 for the DCE generally result from changes in
Crew Station and IUS controls and displays or in simulator Flight Hardware.
Minor changes may develop to take care ' of needs for additional control or
instrumentation of simulator functions.
Notice that the changes discussed may originate from needs to modify the
simulation system, or from needs to modify the simulator Self Test System.
Changes in one system generally impact configuration of the other system.
This relationship is shown in the Table. Also, it should be noted that the
characteristic parameter data base, as expected, 1s only affected when new
hardware is introduced into the system, or when some hardware is removed or
replaced.
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SECTION 7
SELF TEST SYSTEM COST DATA
Relative cost data for addition of automatic self test capability to the
Reference Configuration Simulator is shown in Table 7.0-1. No absolute dollar
figures are shown because the selection of test component configuration, packaging,
manufacturing, and installation techniques are dependent on the actual simulator
design used, as well as the date in time when self test systemi implementation
is to take place.
The first column shows cost of self test system elements relative to the
basic cost of the subsystem to be tested. This rating ranges from Negligible
(0-5%) to Moderate (20r-M). No "High" ratings were given to self test cost
for any subsystem as this rating would have implied greater than a 50% increase
in cost of the basic system. Consistent utilization of existing operational
capability in the system for self test purpose is the basic reason for maintaining
cost between Moderate and None.
The five columns to the right of the Table show cost of different factors
in implementing subsystem self test as a percentage of total Self Test System
cost. Some of these factors are estimated as less than 1% and therefore are
shown only as *. The total cost of the Self Test System adds only to 98%;
the remaining 2% is accounted for in the * items and others which exceed the
whole number shown.
The largest percentage of Self Test System cost appears in Visual Simulation
CCTV Self Test. This high percentage is due to the cost of the Digital Processing
Osscilloscope, the special video pattern test signal generators, and the various
signal and noise meters. The cost of visual simulation video component self
test is further increased by test software development cost. This software is
relatively more sophisticated than other elements of the test software in that
it must provide processing capability for various complex waveforms from the
video string. These waveforms have a variety of frequency components, require
sampling rates of up to 50 Megahertz, and include test patterns such as a stair
step and frequency multiburst signals.
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Following closely in percentage of cost is the Crew Station and IOS self
test factors. The high cost of controls and displays checkout is owed to the
large number and variety of components to be testedo which in turn requires a
fairly large characteristic parameter data base. In addition to the data base
software, a generalized routine must be develc ped for each of the types of
components used. Each component must be tested individually and therefore
requires its own unique test calling and control sequence. With component
count in the hundreds (thousands, if switches included), it can be seen that
these sequences make up a considerable amount of software to be written,
integrated, tested, and documented. Also, the large number of components
affect design, manufacturing, and test component costs to make Crew Station
•	 aod IOS self test a high portion of total Self Test System cost.
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SECTION 8
CONCLUSIONS
The system level analyses of the simulator and automatic self test concepts
have yielded several conclusions that help understand the self test process and
the self test system as such. 'This understanding-contributes to comprehensive,
realistic and integrated requirements definition, while at the same time providing
a picture of the cost of self test implementation relative to the operational
advantages gained by its presence in the simulator system.
First of all, it was determined that three levels of testing are required
to achieve effective operational utility of the Self Test System, and increase
availability of the simulator. Readiness Tests yield information as to oper-
ational health of each subsystem. Fault Isolation Tests are called upon to
determine which LRU, if any, has tailed. Incipient Fault Detection Tests gather
performance degradation data to schedule maintenance of-degraded components
before an actual failure occurs. The DCE, Motion Base, and Visual Simulation
subsystems can be adequately checked at the functional level; only if a fault
exists is it necessary to call the more detailed Fault Isolation Test. Other
subsystems must be ' tested at the LRU level in order to ascertain readiness.
Incipient Fault Detectiorr techniques were found to be effectively applicable
to the Motion Base System, the Visual Simulation elements, and to servo driven
instrumentation.
A software structure for the Self Test system was developed. This structure
Conforms to the operational considerations brought about by the three categories
of testing mentioned above, and depends largely on the use of utility test
modules that minimize redundancy and maximize programming efficiency.
No significant increase in hardware was found to be needed to implement the
simulator self test capability developed in the course of the study. On a
subsystem basis, the relative cost of adding self test hardware was found to be
from moderate to none. The greatest hardware impact is found in the DCE because
of the more than 100% increase in number of analog channels, and in the Visual
Simulation because of the Digital Processing Oscilloscope, signal generators, and
signal meters needed to perform specially designed video component tests.
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Change impact analysis indicated that changes'occurring during operational
phase of the simulator would be felt most in Crew Station and IOS controls and
displays, in the Flight Hardware components of the simulator, and in the DCE.
The magnitude of this impact cannot be assessed a priori. as the effect of a
{	 change greatly depends on the nature of the change and the components involved.
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